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!£BARD 11. RICHFIELD

OIL

CORP.

[56 C.2d

[L. A. No. 25991. In Bank. Aug. 81,1961.]

MARY V. LEBARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RICHFIELD
.OIL CORPORATION et al, Defendants and Respondents.
[1] Oil-Regulation-Well Spacing: Leases-Royalties.-Pub. Resources Code, § 3608, giving the owner of land less than an
acre in area and surrounded by lands subject to an oil lease
of an acre or more the right to share in the production under
the lease, provides, not that the owners of the oil and gas
mineral rights at the time the land is deemed included shall
receive the royalties, but that after that time the owners of
those rights shall receive the royalties. Since the statute
contemplates a continuing relationship between the owners of
those rights and the lessee, it is the current owners who are
to be paid.
[2] Id.-Regulation-Well Spacing: Leases-Royalties.-Pub. Resources Code, § 3608, is valid and gives an owner of property
of less than an acre in area an adequate means of protection
or substitute for his right to extract oil from his property.
That right belongs to the owner of the land and passes with
a conveyance of the land unless it is severed by a reservation
or has been severed by a prior grant. To be effective, a substitute for that right must necessarily inure to its owner; the
code section provides that it does so inure and in no way
purports to sever the right to receive royalties from the ownership of the oil and gas mineral rights for the duration of the
lease in which the land is deemed included.
[3] Id. - Regulation - Well Spacing: Leases - Royalties - Community Lease.-Pub. Resources Code, § 3608, does not in effect
make an owner of property of less than an acre in area a community lessor with the lessors of the surrounding lands subject to an oil lease of an acre or more, and the rules governing
community oil leases do not fit the pattern established by § 8608
for compensating owners who have been deprived of the right
to recover oil and gas from their lands, but are based on the
existence of cross-conveyances, concerning which the code section makes no provision.
[4] Id. - Regulation - Well Spacing: Leases - Royalties - Community Lease.-The rules governing community oil leases require segregating the oil and gas produced from each parcel
included in the lease, since the lessor's royalty from oil and
gas produced from his own land is appurtenant whereas his
royalty from oil and gas produced from his colessors is in gross.
[1] See OalJur.2d, Oil and Gas, §§ 301, 811.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1-5] Oil, §§ 3.1, 30.
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Pub. Resources Code, § 3608, providing for payment to owners
of land less than an acre in area surrounded by other lands
under an oil and gas lease, makes no provision for segregating
production according to its source and dividing the specified
payments on that basis between the current owner of the land
included and the owner of the land at the time it was deemed
included; instead, it ties the right to payments to the ownership of the oil and gas mineral rights in the land and makes
clear that the entire payments are appurtenant to those rights.
i6] ld. - Regulation - Well Spacing: Leases - Royalties - Oommunity Lea.se.-Community leases are only one method for
achieving common oil development, and whether in any given
agreement for unit development the rules governing community
oil leases will be applicable between the parties ,vill depend
on the terms of the agreement. These rules mayor may not
apply among the actual parties to a lease in which land is
deemed included pursuant to Pub. Resources Code, § 3608,
providing for payment to owners of land less than an acre
in area surrounded by other lands under an oil and gas leal!le,
Ilnd there is no basis for assuming that those rules are implicit
in the code section.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John F. McCarthy, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to establish right to a prorated share of oil royalties.
Judgment for defendants after demurrers to complaint were
sustained without leave to amend, affirmed.
Joseph R. Grillo for Plaintiff and Appellant.
William E. Woodroof and William D. Foote for Defendants
and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1955 plaintiff owned less than one acre
of land that was surrounded by other lands subject to an oil
and gas lease held by defendant Richfield Oil Corporation as
lessee. Richfield recorded a declaration of pooling individual
oil and gas leases held by it in the vicinity into Operating
Unit A and filed a notice of intention to drill on the land
surrounding plaintiff's land. On March 14, 1955, pursuant
to section 3608 of the Public Resources Code, the State Oil
and Gas Supervisor recorded a der.laration that plaintiff'::;
land was deemed to be included in Richfield's OperatingUnit A. On March 18, 1955, plaintiff sold and conveyed her
land to defendants Kalmikov, and on May 12, 1955, the Kal.
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mikovs sold and conveyed the land to defendants Flores but
reserved to themselves "all oil, gas, mineral and any other
kindred substances in, on or under said land but without right
of surface entry to said property."
In 1955 section 3608 of the Public Resources Code provided: 1
"Where land aggregating less than one acre is surrounded
by other lands, which other lands are subject to an oil and gas
lease aggregating one acre or more, and if, under the provisions
of Sections 3600 to 3607, inclusive, of the Public Resources
Code, the drilling or producing of a well on said land is
declared to be a public nuisance, said land shall, for oil and
gas development purposes and to prevent waste and to protect
the oil and gas rights of landowners, be deemed included in
said oil and gas leasehold on said other lands when there is
filed with the State Oil and Gas Supervisor a notice of intention to drill a well upon the said leasehold covering said other
lands and the State Oil and Gas Supervisor has caused to be
recorded with the county recorder of the county in which said
land aggregating less than one acre is located a declaration
as hereinafter provided....
"The owners of the oil and gas mineral rights in said land
so deemed included in said oil and gas leasehold on said other
lands, as herein provided, shall thereafter receive in money,
based upon the production of oil and gas from said leasehold
including said land, a pro rata share of the landowners'
royalty determined in accordance with the provisions of said
oil and gas lease in the proportion that the area of said land
bears to the aggregate of the total area covered by said oil
and gas lease including the area of said land; provided further,
that said owners of said oil and gas mineral rights in said
land shall in no case receive less than their pro rata share
determined, as herein provided, on the value of one-eighth
part of the oil and gas produced ... ; and provided further,
that without the consent of said owners of said land the lessee
or operator of said oil and gas leasehold shall have no right
to use the surface of said land nor to use the subsurface thereof
down to a depth of 200 feet below the surface thereof.... "
Plaintiff brought this action to establish her right to royalties accruing pursuant to this section. The Flores defaulted
and Richfield Rnd the Kalmikovs demurred to the complaint.
Their demurrers were sustained without leave to amend and
judgment was entered for them. Plaintiff appeals.

c_

'Section 3608 was amended in 1957 in respeets not material to this
action.
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Plaintiff contends that the "owners of the oil and gas mineral rights in said land so deemed included in said oil and gas
leasehold" to whom the royalties are payable are the owner
or owners of those rights at the time the land is deemed to be
included; not the owner or owners at the times thereafter when
royalties are payable. She therefore concludes that the right
to receive. royalties pursuant to section 3608 is not appurtenant
to the land deemed included in the lease and did not pass to
the Kalmikovs when she conveyed the land to them.
Defendants contend that the owners referred to are the
owner or owners at the time royalties are payable and that
therefore the right to royalties created by section 3608 is
appurtenant to the oil and gas rights in the included land
and passes with a conveyance of that land unless the oil and
gas rights or the right created by section 3608 are reserved.
[1] We agree with defendants' contention. The statute
provides, not that the owners of the oil and gas mineral rights
at the time the land is deemed included shall receive the royalties, but that after that time the owners of those rights shall
receive the royalties. Since the statute contemplates a continuing relationship between the owners of those rights and
the lessee, it reasonably follows that it is the current owners
who are to be paid.
This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of
section 3608. In Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Ca1.2d 315, 317
[223 P.2d 465], we pointed out that "Section 3608 was probably adopted in response to this court's decision in Bernstein
v. Bush, 29 Ca1.2d 773 [177 P.2d 913], where it was held that
the spacing requirement (§ 3600) as applied to the owners
of several small pieces of property was invalid for the reason
that they were wholly deprived of the right to take oil from
their land in that they could not drill an offset well on their
land to prevent the draining of the underlying oil basin by
wells on adjacent land and that 'where, ... the law, in its
application at least, does not afford adequate means of protection as a substitute for the right to drill an offset well'
it is invalidly applied." [2 ] We sustained the validity of
section 3608 in the Hunter case and held that it gave the petitioner therein "an 'adequate means of protection or substitute,' for his right to extract oil from his property." That
right belongs to the owner of the land and passes with a conveyance of the land unless it is severed by a reservation or has
been severed by a prior grant. To be effective, a substitute for
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that right must necessarily inure to its owner. Section 3608
provides that it does so inure, and it in no way purports to
sever the right to receive royalties from the ownership of the
oil and gas mineral rights for the duration of the lease in which
the land is deemed included.
[3] Plainti1f contends, however, that section 3608 in effect
made her a community lessor with Richfield's other lessors
. when her land was deemed included in Operating Unit A and
that therefore the rules governing community oil leases are
applicable. Those rules were stated in Tanner v. Title IftS1lronce & Trust Co., 20 Ca1.2d 814, 820 [129 P.2d 383], as follows:
"By executing the community lease, the respondents and
each of the other lessors assigned or conveyed to his colessors
a percentage interest in all oil produced on his land by the
lessee during the continuance of the lease. The consideration
for that transfer was the similar mutual assignments of the
other lessors. The royalty interest thus transferred by each
landowner to his colessors is an incorporeal hereditament in
gross (Ca'lJ,oJum v. Marlin, supra [3 Oa1.2d 110 (43 P.2d 788,
101 A.L.R. 871)]) and the grantee's interest in the oil produced upon the property of one of the colessors is entirely
separate and distinct from the royalty interest retained by
him in oil which might be produced from his own premises.
The only connection between the two interests is that the
prorata assignment by one of the lessors of the royalty from
his land is the consideration for the conveyance of the other
lessors to him.
"Although the cases clearly establish that the percentage
of the royalty reserved by a lessor in oil produced from his
land passes to a grantee of the fee as an incident of the conveyance (see cases collected in note 94 A.L.R. 660), except as
such rights are reserved by the deed, the incorporeal hereditament owned by the grantor in the oil produced from the land
of the colessors, existing in gross,· obviously does not follow
the conveyance of the lessor's land, but can only be conveyed
by a specific transfer of that interest."
It is immediately apparent that the rules stated with respect to a community oil lease of the kind that was before
the court in the Tanner case do not l1t the pattern established
by section 3608 for compensating owners who have been deprived of the right to recover oil and gas from their lands.
Thus, the Tanner rules are based on the existence of crossconveyances. Section 3608 makes no provision for cross-con.veyances. [4] The Tanner rules require segregating the
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oil and gas produced from each parcel included in the lease,
for the lessor's royalty from oil and gas produced from his
own land is appurtenant whereas his royalty from oil and gas
produced from the land of his colessors is in gross. Section
3608 makes no provision for segregating production according to its source and dividing the specified payments on that
basis between the current owner of the land deemed included
and the owner of that land at the time that it was deemed
included. Instead, it ties the right to payments to the ownership of the oil and gas mineral rights in the land and makes
clear that the entire payments are appurtenant to those rights.
If community leasefl of the kind considered in Tanner represented the exclusive or even preponderant method of developing oil lands owned by many persons, there might be reason
to interpret section 3608 to fit the pattern of the Tanner rules,
although to do so would compel implying legislative purpose
and provision not readily apparent from the language of the
statute. [ 5 ] Community leases are only one method for
achieving common oil development, however, and agreements
for the pooling of individual leases, as in this case, and
other forms of unit operation are not uncommon. Whether
in any given agreement for unit development, the Tanner rules
will be applicable between the parties will depend on the terms
of the agreement. Moreover, it would not be unreasonable for
the parties to provide that all of the royalties payable to an
individual lessor pursuant to unit operation should be appurtenant to his land to avoid the problem of apportionment that
arises under the Tanner rules in the event of a sale without
a reservation of the mineral rights or an assignment of the
royalties held in gross. Richfield contends that the pooling
provisions of the individual leases it has pooled into Operating
Unit A in this case do so provide and urges that we so hold.
Weare here concerned, however, with the rights provided by
section 3608; not with the rights of the parties who voluntarily
entered leases with Richfield. It would be inappropriate to
pass on their rights in their absence. It is sufficient to note
that the Tanner rules mayor may not apply among the actual
parties to a lease in which land is deemed included pursuant to
section 3608 and that there is therefore no basis for assuming
that those rules are implicit in the statute.
Plaintiff's ri~ht to receive the payments provided by section
3608 terminated when she transferred her land without rer;:erving the oil and gas mineral rights therein, and since she
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has not alleged that any royalties accrued before that transfer,
her complaint does not state a cause of action.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgment
for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Ashburn in the dissenting opinion prepared by him for the District Court of
Appeal in LeBard v. Richfield Oil Corp. (Cal.App.), 12 Cal.
Rptr.288.

